The key points
- Taiwan's chip industry grew out of a government research institute, ITRI, which licensed technology from RCA in 1976 and spun off UMC in 1980 and TSMC in 1987.
- TSMC's dedicated foundry model allowed chip designers to outsource manufacturing, and the company held an estimated 72.5% of top-10 foundry revenue in the second quarter of 2026.
- Industry studies have estimated that Taiwan hosted about 92% of the world's sub-10 nm logic capacity, a concentration that analysts link to geopolitical, natural hazard and resource risks.
- New fabs in the United States, Japan and Europe are expected to reduce, but not remove, this concentration over the next decade.
Origins: a research institute and a technology licence
Taiwan's semiconductor industry traces back to the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a government-backed research body established in 1973. ITRI's own history describes a 1974 meeting of government and industry figures, including RCA engineer Wen-Yuan Pan, that set out a plan for integrated circuits. In 1976 ITRI signed a technology transfer and licensing contract with RCA, and in 1977 it opened Taiwan's first IC production line, which ITRI says reached a 70% yield within six months. [1]
ITRI then turned research into companies. In 1980 it created United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), transferring its 4-inch wafer technology and R&D team; UMC was among the first tenants of the Hsinchu Science Park and in 1985 became Taiwan's first listed semiconductor company. In 1984 ITRI launched a very large-scale integration (VLSI) project to develop its own technology, which it describes as a response to barriers to acquiring foreign technology. [2][1]
TSMC and the dedicated foundry model
In 1985 Morris Chang was invited to return to Taiwan as ITRI's president to lead development of 6-inch wafer technology. In 1987 ITRI spun off Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), transferring fabs, equipment, technology and 98 staff. ITRI describes TSMC as introducing the world's first dedicated IC contract manufacturing model, in which the company manufactures chips designed by its customers instead of selling its own. [2][1]
This foundry model underpins the modern fabless industry. SIA and BCG describe foundries as serving fabless designers and integrated manufacturers alike, spreading the very high capital cost of fabs, which they estimated at up to 20 billion dollars for an advanced logic fab, across many customers. TSMC reports that in 2025 it made products for 534 customers using 305 process technologies. [3][6]
A company designing an AI accelerator can therefore focus on architecture and software, send its design to a foundry, and receive finished wafers without owning a factory. The same foundry may be producing phone processors, networking chips and GPUs for competing customers at the same time.
The cluster: science parks and suppliers
Taiwan's industry developed as a dense cluster, with ITRI spinning off not just chipmakers but also suppliers such as Taiwan Mask Corporation in 1989. The Hsinchu Science Park became home to UMC, and Hsinchu is also where TSMC is based. TSMC now operates six 12-inch GIGAFAB facilities offering processes from 0.13 micrometres down to 2 nm. The company says it is expanding advanced packaging capacity in Chiayi and Tainan and building a facility in Taichung for a future 1.4 nm process. [1][2][8][13]
Proximity between foundries, packaging firms, mask makers, equipment service engineers and chip designers shortens the time needed to solve production problems. SIA and BCG found in 2021 that mainland China and Taiwan together held more than 60% of global assembly, packaging and test capacity, meaning much of the back end of the supply chain sits close to Taiwan's fabs. [3]
Risks analysts discuss
Geopolitical risk receives the most attention. A 2023 RAND tabletop exercise concluded that production of the highest-end chips exists almost entirely in Taiwan and that there were generally no good short-term options if that supply were disrupted. Rhodium Group estimated in 2022 that well over 2 trillion dollars of economic activity would be at risk from a blockade, which it described as a floor. A 2025 CSIS series of 26 wargames on a possible blockade highlighted Taiwan's energy system as a key vulnerability, while also finding that a blockade would create escalation pressures that are difficult to contain. [9][10][11]
Natural hazards and resources are also discussed. After a magnitude 7.4 earthquake in Hualien in April 2024, TSMC said about 70% of tools had recovered within 10 hours and that critical equipment such as EUV machines was undamaged; analysts nonetheless used the event to highlight concentration risk. In early 2021 a severe drought led TSMC to order water by truck, and a reservoir serving Hsinchu fell to under 15% of capacity. [12][13]
Analysts differ on how to respond. RAND's report recommends incentivising some relocation of capacity and coordinating with allies, while also noting that building alternative production is expensive and slow, a point its exercise participants had often underestimated. Moody's analysts quoted after the 2024 earthquake argued for greater geographic diversification of suppliers. These are live policy debates in Taiwan, the United States, Japan and Europe, and assessments of the likelihood of any disruption vary widely. [9][12]
Diversification under way
TSMC is expanding abroad while keeping its most advanced development in Taiwan. According to its 2025 annual report, its first Arizona fab entered high-volume production in late 2024 and a second is expected in the second half of 2027; its first fab in Kumamoto, Japan began volume production at the end of 2024; and a specialty fab in Dresden, Germany is progressing. In March 2025 TSMC announced plans to raise its planned US investment to 165 billion dollars, including more fabs and two advanced packaging plants. [6][7]
SIA and BCG project that the US share of global fab capacity will rise from 10% in 2022 to 14% in 2032 and that the US will host nearly 30% of sub-10 nm logic capacity by then, while Taiwan remains one of the largest centres. [4]
What it means for GPU compute buyers
Nearly every high-end data center GPU on the market today depends on Taiwanese foundry and packaging capacity at some stage. That makes TSMC's capacity plans and any disruption in Taiwan one of the most important upstream factors for GPU supply, even for buyers who only ever rent compute in the cloud. Overseas fabs add resilience over time, but for the next few years the leading edge will remain heavily concentrated.
Kovara shows how these upstream conditions feed through to the market you actually buy in. Compare current GPU prices across providers, check which regions list specific accelerators, or ask Kova how supply for a given GPU has moved recently.
Sources & editorial note
Reference documentation is listed below with its recorded check date. Technical statements are attributed; passages framed as our view or recommendation are editorial interpretation. Examples are hypothetical unless explicitly identified otherwise. No independent Kovara hardware testing is claimed.
- ITRI Today · The birth of Taiwan's semiconductor industry ↗ (opens in a new tab)Government-affiliated source · Checked 29 September 2026
- ITRI · Developing semiconductors from scratch: Taiwan's semiconductor history ↗ (opens in a new tab)Government-affiliated source · Checked 29 September 2026
- SIA and BCG · Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era (April 2021) ↗ (opens in a new tab)Industry report · Checked 29 September 2026
- SIA and BCG · Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain (May 2024) ↗ (opens in a new tab)Industry report · Checked 29 September 2026
- TrendForce · Global foundry revenue approaches US$53.49 billion in 2Q26 ↗ (opens in a new tab)Industry report · Checked 29 September 2026
- TSMC · 2025 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders ↗ (opens in a new tab)Company report · Checked 29 September 2026
- TSMC · TSMC intends to expand its investment in the United States to US$165 billion ↗ (opens in a new tab)Company report · Checked 29 September 2026
- TSMC · GIGAFAB facilities ↗ (opens in a new tab)Company source · Checked 29 September 2026
- RAND · Supply chain interdependence and geopolitical vulnerability: the case of Taiwan and high-end semiconductors ↗ (opens in a new tab)Think tank analysis · Checked 29 September 2026
- Rhodium Group · The global economic disruptions from a Taiwan conflict ↗ (opens in a new tab)Think tank analysis · Checked 29 September 2026
- CSIS · Lights out? Wargaming a Chinese blockade of Taiwan ↗ (opens in a new tab)Think tank analysis · Checked 29 September 2026
- Manufacturing Dive · Taiwan earthquake's impact on chip industry ↗ (opens in a new tab)News report · Checked 29 September 2026
- The Register · TSMC starts trucking in water amid Taiwan drought (February 2021) ↗ (opens in a new tab)News report · Checked 29 September 2026
Prepared with AI assistance. Publication authorized by Tommaso Luci; this does not claim independent technical peer review. Kovara Research is the publication label, not a claim of an independent laboratory or a named analyst team.
